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Sabrina Lopez presented at The Sixth Polygence Symposium of Rising Scholars. Interested in the next Symposium? Fill out the interest form here for more information.

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Polygence Scholar2021
Sabrina Lopez's profile

Sabrina Lopez

College of Southern NevadaClass of 2017


I am a community college student in Las Vegas, Nevada beginning my study in Philosophy, with an emphasis on Digital Ethics. As a lifelong fan of science fiction and a follower of current events, I strongly feel that the wellbeing of our society hinges greatly on how we approach our relationship with technology, and its proprietors, in the coming decade.


  • The Ethics of Big Tech: An Evaluation of Harm and Responsibility with mentor Kevin (Oct. 8, 2021)

Sabrina's Symposium Presentation

Project Portfolio

The Ethics of Big Tech: An Evaluation of Harm and Responsibility

The Ethics of Big Tech: An Evaluation of Harm and Responsibility

Abstract or project description

There are harms being perpetuated against users by so-called ‘Big Tech’ corporations. When harm is done, one feels naturally prompted to seek responsibility from the harm doer. However in my paper, *The Ethics of Big Tech: An Evaluation of Harm and Responsibility,* I reject the notion that corporations are fully moral agents capable of bearing moral responsibility, and argue instead that they are instead vicarious agents of the moral agents which helm them. I then defend that we nevertheless have duties to prevent these corporations from harming us. First, I disassemble popular arguments both in favor of and against corporate moral agency and find corporations to be non-moral, more specifically ‘vicarious’ agents which act as extensions of controlling, intentionally ‘interlocked’ moral agents. Second, I utilize a thought experiment in the form of an alien invasion to demonstrate the duties moral agents have towards harm avoidance in order to demonstrate a way in which harmed technology users might proceed following the qualification of corporations as non-moral agents. I conclude that while vicarious agents cannot *themselves* be held morally responsible, the corporation can and must be regulated-- as well as those morally culpable agents of which they are an extension held responsible-- by harmed moral agents in line with their duty to act in a manner pursuant to harm avoidance.